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Response
Rado Bradistilov
I. Introduction
The end of the Cold War caught scholars of transnational life
unprepared to indicate new directions for mutual understand-
ing, peace, and prosperity that could fully utilize the favorable
circumstances at hand. Although one should realize the
immense potential for restructuring to make a new world order,
one should be wary of a backlash these developments might
provoke. As a respondent to Dr. Galtung’s paper, I want to
share both my optimism and concerns and to formulate my
views on the coming world order.
The foremost lesson I picked from Dr. Galtung’s paper is that
one cannot contemplate world peace and stability without opti-
mism and belief in the good will of humanity. I accept, too, that
no matter how problematic this huge task might seem, one
should still believe in its possibilities. This is not to negate rea-
son and intelligent skepticism in the service of sheer idealism
duplicative of those of the past.
II. Global Problematique
Every historical period has its basic questions, which best
express the essential constitution of its times. The present histor-
ical moment, beginning with the end of the Cold War, is charac-
terized by vast political, socioeconomic, and cultural shifts. As
in any other period, the upcoming world order will be accompa-
nied by its own ideals, specific goals, and potential conflicts.
I would like to thank Dr. Galtung for his articulation of the
various conflict formations that exist or are likely to arise in the
world of today and tomorrow. To avoid repetition, I will not
discuss the already mentioned conflicts of human vs. nonhu-
man, gender, race, generation, and class. Instead, I would like to
add two more, which, in my opinion, are very relevant but not
fully attended to in Dr. Galtung’s paper. They are the global
clash of cultures (including heritage, religion, and ideology) and
the conflict over capital.
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Before explaining why I believe these two issues should be
included in the list of potential conflicts, I would like to discuss
another concept that takes center stage in Dr. Galtung’s work—
the concept of democracy. Dr. Galtung defines democracy “as
rule by which rulers have the consent of the ruled.” Other popu-
lar definitions are “government of the people,” “rule of the
majority,” “the absence of hereditary class distinctions and priv-
ileges.” I agree with Dr. Galtung that democracy is the most
applauded principle in the world today, but I hesitate to accept
its universalism in the new world order. I also think that trying
to achieve democracy is important, since it is believed to best
express the demands of the individual, but I would like to dif-
ferentiate between the concept of democracy and what would be
“global governance” through “global democracy.” During the
Cold War years, the West concentrated on establishing democ-
racy inside countries one at a time, but the current situation
demands that global democracy be established as a world sys-
tem. Consequently, the main challenge facing the international
community is the emergence of such a democracy available and
acceptable to all. But, despite some agreement on conceptualiza-
tion, democracy is still a process that, in practice, is interpreted
differently by different people at different times. It is with this
caveat in mind that I move on to discuss the two major tension
points mentioned earlier. How we come out on both will signifi-
cantly shape the order of the world to come.
A. The Global Clash of Ideologies
The history of human civilization has produced cultures so
unique, so powerful, and so different from one another that they
could be an immense resource to humanity, but they could also
create serious complications with respect to seeking one global
goal such as global democracy. As Dr. Galtung points out, the
world of today is surely not a democracy. We are witnessing a
global movement for democratization, as has been the case in
Eastern Europe since 1989, but there are numerous societies at
the present time that are either barely democratic or crudely
oppressive. The moral issue I see is that most societies have
emerged from different circumstances; so, why are we so prone
to believe that democracy would be the logical answer to each
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and every one? That is not to say that some nations would
choose to be oppressive or that their citizens enjoy being perse-
cuted, but maybe there is another system — one different from
“Western-style” democracy — that they would want and that
would suit their needs and heritages. Moreover, it is well to
remember that when one is talking about familiar democratic
societies, one usually accepts that these commonalities exist: (1)
a Judeo-Christian world-view, (2) a geographical proximity, and
(3) a similar history, cultural heritage, and evolution.
These are some of the common characteristics of the majority
of today’s democracies, and it is naïve to believe that they have
emerged by chance. Consequently, these distinctive traits create
separateness rather than convergence. According to Samuel
Huntington, the cultural, ideological, and religious differences
will not only shape the face of tomorrow’s world order but will
become the most alarming indicator of potential conflicts.1 A
superficial comparison between the “industrialized” Northwest
and the “developing” South provokes some important conclu-
sions: Christianity, even though it holds an important place in
the list of world religions, is not the most common form of reli-
gion; and the societies inside the democratic zone, in spatial and
quantitative terms, pale in significance relative to the rest of the
world. In reality, then, democratic societies are in the minority.
As a result, if democracy is to be adopted by other societies,
there have to be great incentives. Some of the questions one
might ponder are: Why would “outsiders” (i.e., nondemocratic
states) want to be democracies? What would assure their equal
representation in the global democratic system? Why would
they not be better off on the “outside,” inventing their own pro-
cedures?
B. The Internal Conflict of Capital vs. Capital
This conflict relates to the inner struggle of capital against capi-
tal inside the democratic and free market societies as they com-
pete for international dominance. As Dr. Galtung points out,
these societies come out of individualistic, competitive, and
aggressive cultures. The logical question that arises is, why
would the owners of the means of production (e.g., the transna-
tional and multinational corporations) be willing to give up
Macalester International Vol. 1
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their influence and power to benefit others? After all, the reality
is that they do not usually concern themselves with moral issues
if that would hinder accumulation and the implementation of
their policies. History is replete with instances of multinational
and transnational corporations actually cooperating with non-
democratic regimes in order to take over new markets and
enhance profits. Thus, one should be wary of the power of a
sudden change of the soul of transnational capital.
To construct a model for global democracy, I believe one
needs to present a perspective liberated from the usual weak-
nesses of Western thinking that always radiates reforms from
the center. Some of these pitfalls can be seen through the ongo-
ing experiences of many of the countries that are outside of the
charmed circle of Western capitalist democracies. Let me make
specific, brief reference to four of these “outsiders.”
1. Bulgaria
Since this is my native country, I use it as an example of a typical
Eastern European society in transition to democracy and market
economy, trying to fully integrate itself into the European and
world structures. It is a good place to start in terms of what
democracy might mean to people outside of the West. Before
1989, under the old Communist regime, the citizens of Bulgaria
and Eastern Europe had no political freedom, never participated
in free elections, and abuse and neglect of basic human rights
were common. However, health care was free of charge and
available to all, education was free (including advanced train-
ing), general literacy was much higher than in many democra-
cies of the West, and chronic economic indigence and instability
were practically nonexistent. Now in Bulgaria, health care and
education take up an enormous part of a typical family’s
income, inflation borders on 100 percent for 1994, and the pur-
chasing power of the people diminishes daily. The political
enthusiasm that rose at the beginning of the change toward the
democratization of society has yielded to a wave of pessimism
and despair. Is this the democracy one would like to present to
the world beyond? How is one supposed to believe that having
the right to vote is more important than feeding one’s children?
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2. Iraq, Kuwait, and the Gulf War
Take the Gulf War as a perfect example of two very important
characteristics of the present ordering of the world. The first one
I find very encouraging, the second quite horrifying in terms of
global democracy.
I was amazed at the quick and decisive actions the U.N. Secu-
rity Council took to penalize Iraq for invading Kuwait. This, as
Dr. Galtung points out, is an excellent example of international
cooperation in a time of crisis. What worries me is the motiva-
tion for that cooperation. Why did the U.S. proclaim its concerns
over the nondemocratic, almost feudalistic government of
Kuwait only after the Iraqi invasion? What have been the conse-
quences for democracy in Kuwait after the “rescue”? Did not the
invasion by the coalition provoke a devastating civil war in now
battered and impoverished Iraq? This is not to acquit Saddam
Hussein’s regime of the international crimes it glaringly com-
mitted but, rather, to challenge the correctness of the interven-
tion. Was it justified by the lobbying of the transnational
corporations (such as the oil and arms industries)? Was it the
West’s desire to demonstrate power at a moment when the
Soviet Union and the bipolar international system were disinte-
grating? These are disturbing questions whose answers will
affect the inception of a new democratic global governance.
3. Bosnia
Compared to the Gulf War, the raging war in Bosnia does not
seem to spark as much decisive action by the U.N. and the inter-
national community. The economic embargo against Yugoslavia
hurts not only millions of innocent people inside the country but
also outsiders as well. (It is estimated that Bulgaria and other
neighboring countries are experiencing heavy losses due to the
embargo, hindering the prospect of economic development.) A
few hundred “peacekeeping” troops and a dozen planes filled
with humanitarian supplies do not compensate for the longevity
and viciousness of the conflict. More people continue to perish
in Bosnia than died during the entire 1991 Gulf War. Why, then,
does the democratic and righteous West not react to this crisis in
a way that would instantly terminate the atrocities? In what way
Macalester International Vol. 1
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are peace and democracy in Kuwait more precious than the lives
of the war victims in the former Yugoslavia? Why do the powers
of the U.S. and Europe not take the initiative with similar alarm
and decisiveness and direct the world’s attention toward resolv-
ing the conflict?
It seems that there are other factors involved. I do not intend
to be flippant, but could it be that it is still too early for President
Clinton to act since the election is some time off? (We all remem-
ber how Bush’s popularity skyrocketed during the Gulf War.)
Maybe Brussels intentionally closes its eyes, having enough
problems of its own in establishing a strong European Union?
But, how can one think about global stability and order when
Europe is unwilling to act together? Bosnia does not have
Kuwait’s oil resources, but nobody can convince me that the
people of that country are less precious. How, then, are these
“outsider” societies to believe in the correctness of Western-
propagated democracy when the double standards of the
world’s democracies are apparent? Who would want this
democracy, much less to globalize it? Crises like the one in
Bosnia provide the best opportunities for the democratic West to
convince the rest of the world through just and decisive action
that global democracy is feasible and, furthermore, the only
alternative. Only by seizing these opportunities can the West
expect the cooperation and enthusiasm of the rest of the world.
4. Haiti
While the U.S. Government has not officially declared war on
any country since WWII, interventions and attacks on Korea,
Vietnam, Libya, and Grenada, among others, can hardly prove
U.S. respect for others’ sovereignty. President Aristide was
ousted in 1991, roughly three years ago. Is the United States’
delayed reaction just a coincidence? I realize that the refugee cri-
sis has much to do with the current U.S. position, but according
to leading foreign policy experts, the situation in Haiti has
become so devastating since the embargo (e.g., in early Septem-
ber a gallon of gas cost eleven U.S. dollars), that, military inter-
vention or not, refugees will continue to sail for the U.S. The
question arises: Is the coming intervention really meant to cope
with the crisis, or is it meant to send a message that the U.S. can
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still invade other countries on the basis of national interest with-
out even a formal declaration of war? If the military dictatorship
in Haiti is pushed out and the elected president “returned” to
power, how is his government to retain that power in the face of
predictions that the country’s economic conditions could
worsen immensely? In Haiti today, the average annual income
is about $125, and 1 percent of the population controls 50 per-
cent of the resources. I would like to ask, then, how global
democracy and governance would relieve Haiti’s agony? Is this
second U.S. intervention going to make a lasting difference?
These four examples are only a small part of the problema-
tique of today’s world order (or disorder). The following conclu-
sions could be made based on the above examples:
• Democracy exists inside some countries but not in others.
Moreover, the foreign policy of democratic countries does not
always aid the establishment of democracy in other countries.
The state in the West is still guided by remnants of imperial-
ism and is oftentimes disabled by the pressures from domes-
tic interest groups.
• The notion that the idea of democracy “won” the moral argu-
ment is probably true, but it carries the danger of a righteous-
ness and smugness that could jettison accountability.
III. Global Governance
I agree with Dr. Galtung that the most feasible way to build a
system of global governance would be to use the already exist-
ing but revised international structures, such as the U.N.
I would like to present a crude sketch of what I view as one
possible initiative toward the goal of global democracy and gov-
ernance. I undertake this with the help of Susan Strange’s work.2
She stresses that any intelligent reforming of the international
system depends upon sophisticated understanding of how the
main structures of power — security, production, finance, and
knowledge — work as well as their relationships to the funda-
mental value preferences of all societies: security, justice, free-
dom, and wealth. First, all nation-states in existence should be
recognized by the U.N. and then become active members of the
organization in order to assure equal representation for all. On
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the issue of equality, I believe that the format of the General
Assembly, whereby each and every nation-state receives one
vote despite population, area, or other factors, should be contin-
ued. The General Assembly would, therefore, function as a
World Parliament.
The Security Council should be a subset of that World Parlia-
ment where, again, each country is to have one vote. I do not
believe the current status of the Security Council (where the
United States, Russia, United Kingdom, France, and China have
veto power) is just. The power of vetoing the decisions of the
Council is either to be terminated or mandated in such a way
that, say, every five years, all members of the Security Council
vote for a new Veto Block according to the countries’ global per-
formance toward global peace. This is my proposal concerning
the security structure. The Security Council would have lower
status than the General Assembly and would receive its direc-
tives from the latter.
Technology today advances at an immense speed. Jacques
Attali concludes in Millennium that those who have access to
these powerful machines will be the ones with real power in
tomorrow’s world order.3 Therefore, I propose the establishment
of a global Council for Technology where statesmen/women
and scientists together (again with equal representation of mem-
bers) would be responsible for ensuring efficient and fair use of
technology.
This would be linked to the work of what I would call the
Production Council. Its main purpose would be the balancing of
social and economic conditions throughout the world. Progress
in these areas could lead to favorable social and political conse-
quences such as declining immigration, reduction of political
and military coups, war, and genocide. Poverty, unemployment,
and massive pauperism would also drastically diminish, per-
haps eventually becoming a tolerable nuisance.
None of this, however, could be accomplished without a
strong and unified financial structure. The Council of Finance
would become the antithesis of the existing GATT. I propose the
termination — or, initially, the minimization — of taxes and tar-
iffs, thereby stimulating economic growth and increasing the
living standards of what we call today the Third World soci-
eties. The Council of Finance would have as one of its tasks the
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investigation of and control over the power of the transnational
corporations. This is not to suggest the usurpation of the right of
decision-making of each firm; rather, the objective would be to
regulate the international activities of those firms in a universal
fashion.
IV. Conclusion
I cannot elaborate on these sentiments at the moment. However,
the complexities they conjure up are important to note. These
issues should be approached with a great amount of care and
patience in order to avoid bitter scenarios, such as those
described by Attali. There is little doubt that the times are both
beckoning and frightening. Dr. Galtung has incited us to aim
high in our thinking toward a new and more humane world
order. I urge everyone to stay attentive to global developments
and participate in the intense discussion about where we ought
to be, why, and how.
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